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OPTIMAL MONEY BURNING: THEORY
AND APPLICATION TO CORPORATE
DIVIDEND POLICY
ABSTRACT
We explore signaling behavior in settings with a discriminating signal and several costly
nondiscriminating (“money burning”) activities. In settings where informed parties have many
options for burning money, existing theory provides no basis for selecting one nondiscriminating
activity over another. When senders have private information about the costs of these activities, each
sender’s indifference is resolved, the taxation of a nondiscriminating signal is Pareto improving, and
the use of the taxed activity becomes more widespread as the tax rate rises. We apply this analysis
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Bronx, NY 10458-5158I. Introduction
Models involving the signaling of private information through costly activities have been
used to explain a wide range of wonomic phenomena. Signaling in the style of Spence [1974]
requires the existence of a “discriminating” activity which is more costly for low quality types
than for high quality types. When the marginal cost of this activity is always higher for low
quality types than for high quality types, the Spence-Mirrl=s “single crossing property” is said
to hold. If the single crossing property fails, it may still be possible to support a signaling
equilibrium through the use of a discriminating activity (as long as total costs are higher for the
low quality type); however, this may involve a level of activity at which marginal costs are
higher for high quality types than for low quality types. In that case, it is in the interest of high
quality types to differentiate themselves by using the discriminatory activity (at a lower level)
in combination with an activity that is “nondiscriminating, “ in the sense that its marginal cost
is the same irrespective of quality. This observation gives rise to theones in which wonomic
agents have incentives to engage in observable, nondiscriminating resource dissipation, or
“money burning.”
As we discuss below, previous signaling models have usually posited at most one
meehanism for burning money. In most settings, however, there are many ways to dissipate
resources observably, and existing theory provides no basis for selwting one nondiscriminatory
signal over another. This is sometimes viewed as an inherent shortcoming of dl signaling-cum-
money-burning explanations of monomic behavior.
For concreteness, consider the analysis of Milgrom and Roberts [1986], who present a
model in which a firm wishes to signal that its products are of high quality. Managers of firms
1use two choice variables to convey information to the public: the introductory price of the good,
and the amount spent on advertising. The costs of advertising are assumed to be independent
of type. In contrast, the costs and benefits of varying introductory price do depend on the firm’s
unobsewed characteristics. Thus, varying introductory price is a discriminatory activity, while
advertising is a nondiscriminatory activity. Since the single crossing property does not hold for
variations in introductory price, burning money through advertising may emerge as part of an
efficient equilibrium signal.
In a related model, Bagwell and Bemheim [1996] consider conspicuous consumption as
a means of signaling personal wealth. Varying expenditures on a conspicuous good
discriminates between individuals on the basis of wdth over some ranges. In contrast, reducing
consumption of the conspicuous good for any fixed level of expenditure (which is accomplished
by overpaying for the conspicuous good) is a nondiscriminatory activity. When the single
crossing property fails to hold globally for total expenditures, Veblen effects (defined as a
preference to pay more for a functionally equivalent branded good) may therefore arise as part
of an efficient signal.
In models such as these, the choice of the means to bum money is inherently arbitrary. 1
Advertising and conspicuous consumption are chosen as means to bum money primarily on the
basis of their visibility. Yet other methods of burning money are plainly available. For
example, in the context of Milgrom and Roberts’ analysis, corporate donations to charity could
in
is
principle fill the same role. Generally, the question of why one method of money burning
chosen above all others has been left open. This paper presents a model, based on a
suggestion in Bemheim [1991], that explores this choice on a more formal basis.
2The motivation and intuition for the current analysis can be understood as follows. It is
important in all money-burning models that nondiscriminating activities dissipate resources at
a known rate that is common for all types. However, with many potential money-burning
activities, the true rate of resource dissipation for the sender is not naessarily known to
receivers. Consider, for example, signaling of product quality by corporations. Advertising
may confer some benefit on the firm in terms of image or public relations. The true amount of
money burned is advertising expenses net of these benefits. Moreover, managers may have
private information about the size of these benefits, even when advertising is nondiscriminatory
(in the sense that net benefits are unrelated to quality). Likewise, managers may receive
“psychic income” from their corporations’ charitable contributions, with the magnitude of this
benefit varying in ways that are both unrelated to product quality, and known only to the
manager. As private information about the true rate of resource dissipation becomes more
important, the problem of inference may also become more problematic. For example, if one
observes a company making substantial charitable contributions, does one infer that the company
must produce a high quality product, or that the managers have relatively strong preferences for
charity?
In this paper, we explore the optimal method of burning money in situations where
several nondiscriminating activities are available as potential signals (in addition to a single
discriminating activity). The incentive to bum money arises from our assumption that the single
discriminating activity fails
of each nondiscriminatory
to satisfy the single crossing property
activity is agent-specific and known
globally. The true net cost
only to the sender, but is
unrelated to the sender’s quality. We demonstrate that, in this setting, each agent stnctl y prefers
3a single money-burning activity to all others. However, since the preferred form of money
burning differs from agent to agent, the theory generates an endogenous distribution of signaling
strategies. In general, every potential money-burning activity will be chosen as a method of
signaling by some positive fraction of agents.
This theory of optimal money burning has the following two strong, and rather surprising
implications: first, an increase in the observable component of the cost of a nondiscriminatory
activity (e.g. resulting from an increase in the tax rate on that activity) leads to more widespread
use of that activity as a money-burning signal; second, the taxation of a nondiscriminating signal
is Pareto improving. Intuitively, an increase in an observable ta_xon an activity reduces the
significance of private information about the level of the activity required to dissipate the
equivalent of one dollar, thereby “purifying” the activity as a signal of quality. It is worth
mentioning that once an agent begins to use an activity as a money-burning signal, further
increases in the tax rate reduce the level of the activity undertaken in quilibrium. Thus, an
increase in taxation has an ambiguous effect on the aggregate volume of the activity.
These general results are then applied to the case of a corporation signaling financial
strength to investors through the use of cash distributions to shareholders. Since the tax code
treats cash dividends unfavorably relative to other methods of increasing net cash flows to
shareholders (particularly when the firm is also issuing new equity), the practice of paying
dividends is widely viewed as a puzzle. Bemheim [1991] points out that, in the corporate
setting, limited liability naturally leads to a failure of the single crossing property, and that the
optimal signal may therefore combine net distributions with a nondiscriminatory money burning
activity, such as making net distributions in a tax-disfavored form. Naturally, firms may also
4choose other methods of burning money, such as charity, unproductive advertising, and wanton
destruction of plant and equipment. However, Bemheim argues that dividends offer a better
method of nondiscriminating dissipation for most firms because the investing public has better
information about the associated tax costs (which, after all, are incurred by the investors rather
than by the firm),
The current analysis demonstrates that Bemheim’s theory has the following strong
implications: the taxation of dividends is Pareto improving, and an increase in the relative tax
burden on dividends should increase the number of firms that use dividends to signal profitability
(it may increase or decrease the total volume of dividends). The second implication is
potentially testable. Although previous studies have found a negative relation betwun dividend
taxation and the aggregate level of dividends, this is consistent with our theory, and does not
rule out the possibility that the tax might nevertheless increase the number of firms choosing to
pay dividends. We explore this latter possibility empirically, and find that there is indeed a
reasonably strong tendency for the fraction of corporations that pay dividends to move in the
same dirwtion as the dividend tax rate, even when other factors are accounted for.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II outlines the general signaling model and
derives results. Section 111applies the theory to the case of firms paying cash dividends to




We consider a signaling model consisting of a “sender” and a “receiver.” The sender
5has private information concerning a vector of characteristics, ~. One can think of ~ as the
sender’s “type.” We decompose type as follows: ~ = (Q,~), where Q will be interpreted as the
sender’s “quality,” while ~ will summarize other characteristics, detailed below. We will
assume for simplicity that quality is either “high” (QJ or “low” (QJ. The sender initiates the
process of interaction by choosing a “message,” m = (x,z), where x (a scalar) will be a
potentially discriminating activity, and z (a K-dimensional vector) will consist of
nondiscriminating activities. Each component of the message m is constrained to be non-
negative,
Having observed the sender’s message, the receiver selects a “response,” R. The
receiver’s response may depend upon inferences about the sender’s type. Thus, we write the
receiver’s response as R(P), where P represents the receiver’s probabilistic assessment that the
sender is of high quality, given the observed message m. Henceforth, we will use R~ to denote
R(l), and R~ to denote R(0). We assume that RH # R~, and we adopt the normalization that
R~ > R~.
In the preceding paragraph, we have
determines the response function R(P). In
assumption:
intentionally bmn vague
some instances, we will
about the process that
impose the following
Assumption R
R(P) maximizes pu(R,QJ + (1-P)u(R,Q), where u(R,Q) represents the rmeiver’s payoff
associated with response R and quality Q,
Under assumption R, the receiver does not care directly about x or z. However, these variables
6LThe single crossing property is equivalent to the assumption that *(R) = + co.
We will use T to denote the probability that a sender’s quality is Q~. We will assume
that Q is distributed independently of T. Each marginal cost parameter y~may take on any value
in the interval [~,&], where ~ > 0 (so that each activity definitely has a positive cost), and
where ~ may be infinite. The probability density function describing the distribution of the
vector ~ is denoted f(~l,... ,~~. We will assume that the support of this distribution is
r q x~.l [Lk,B~], so that all possible types are potentially represented. Finally, both u and f
are taken to be public knowledge.
We study equilibria in which potential senders achieve full separation of types along the
dimension of quality, Q.2 As in most signaling contexts, our model can give rise to a variety
of separating equilibria. 3 We take the view that the requirements of perfect Bayesian equilibria
(s= Fudenberg and Tirole [1991])are minimal restrictions on the reasonableness of an outcome,
and we refine the equilibrium set accordingly. Using standard arguments, one can easily show
that, in any perfect Bayesian separating equilibrium, low quality types choose m = 0.4 Non-
imitation by all low quality types then requires each high quality type to select (x,z) satisfying
K
(2) V(x,R~,Q~) - ~ y~z~ s V(0)RL>QL)
k=l
for all ~ l r. This is, of course, equivalent to
K
(3) V(X,RH,QL) - ~ Lkzk s V(O,R,,Q~) .
k=l
We will further refine the set of separating equilibrium by assuming that each high
quality type differentiates itself from lower quality types in the most efficient manner possible.
8Formally, we focus on equilibria in which type (Q~,~) chooses (x,z) to maximize
U(X,Z,RH,Q~,~), subject to expression (3) and non-negativity constraints on x and Z.5 Using
standard arguments, one can easily verify that this is
survives the application of the “equilibria m dominance”
[1987].
B. The Choice of a Nondiscriminating Signal
Our primary focus in this paper is on the
The following result provides a characterization
Theorem 1
the only separating equilibrium which
refinement proposed by Cho and Kreps
sender’s choice of a nondiscriminating
of this choice:
signal.
me most eficient signal for agents of type (QH,~) involves the use of the k-th
nondiscriminating activi~ lf und only 1~Ak = Tk/~ s ~j/Lj E ~jfor j G {1,2,... ,K}.
Proof. Suppose not. Then there are two activities, j and k, such that+ > h~, and such
that zj- >0 (where stars denote ~uilibrium values).
for each i # j,k; ij = O; and 2~ = z; + (Lj~~)zj”.
Define the vector i as follows: 2i = Zi”
Notice that, since (x*,z”)satisfies (3) and
non-negativity, then (x l ,2) also satisfies (3) and non-negativity. Moreover,
(4) u(x”,2,R~, Q~, Y)
[ ‘- Y’[2)1 “
= u(x*, z*, R~, Q~, y) + zj” Y
Under our supposition, the last term on the right hand side of (4) is strictly positive. Thus,
(x”,z”) could not maximize U(X,Z,RH,Q~,~)subj~t to (3) and non-negativity. 1
9There are several important implications of this thwrem. First, the model resolves the
problem ofindifference across nondiscriminating methdsof burning money. Except on a set
of measure zero, each agent strictly prefers one nondiscriminating activity to all others. Note
that the resolution of this indifference depends critically on the existence of private information
concerning rates of resource dissipation for nondiscriminating activities. In the absence of
private information of this sort, the central indeterminacy would remain, even if rates of
dissipation differed both across activities and across senders,
Second, different agents will use different nondiscriminating signals. Each type is most
attracted to those activities for which his or her relative costs (compared to the lowest cost
incurred by any type) are smallest. Thus, for example, managers with strong preferences for
charity will be more likely to burn money by making charitable contributions than by
advertising.
Third, as long as there is some private information about the costs of all activities, every
nondiscriminating activity is used by some agents to bum money in equilibrium. This is
because, for each activity j, some agents must have ~j very close to Lj. In fact, it is possible
to derive an explicit expression for the fraction of high quality senders choosing any particular
activity. Without loss of generality, we write this expression for activity 1:
‘1 % ‘K
L1m MK
where Mj = (Lj/L1) yl. A nondiscriminating activity is
population when the distribution of marginal costs for that
used by a larger fraction of the
activity are concentrated near (in
10relative terms) the lowest marginal cost for that activity. This will tend to be the case when,
for example, there is relatively little private information about the cost of an activity. In the
limiting case where the costs of an activity are uniform throughout the population, all agents will
(at least weakly) prefer to bum money using that activity. At the other extreme, there is a
tendency not to burn money through activities for which there is a slight possibility that some
agents have little or no costs.
C. Activitv Levels
As noted above, the most efficient signal for type (Q~,-y)can be derived by maximizing
the type’s utility subject to (3) and non-negativity. Since type (Q~,y) uses a single
nondiscriminating activity, k (where & < hj for j E {1,2,... ,K}), the efficient signal is also the
solution to the following problem:
subject to
Hxzk V(X,RH, QH) - Ykzk
V(X>RH, QL) - L~z~ s V(O,RL,QL) ,
in addition to x, z~ > 0.
We will consider interior solutions to this problem (where the non-negativity constraint
on z~is non-binding). It is easy to verify that (7) (the incentive compatibility constraint) must
hold with equality. By substituting the binding constraint into the objective function, we obtain
the following equivalent problem:
11(8) ~axx V(X,RH,Q~) - ~~[V(X,RH,Q~) - V(O,RL, QL)l -
The solution to this problem, denoted x“, is characterized by the following first order condition:
(9) VX(X*,RH,QH) =
where VX(X ,R,Q) denotes the partial
Akv=(x”, RH,QL) s V=(X*,RH, QL) ,
derivative of V with respwt to X.b The ~uilibrium level
of the nondiscriminating activity, z;, is then chosen to satisfy (7):
(lo) z; .[) + [V(X,RH,QL) - V(O,RL,QL)] .
k
Equation (9) immediately establishes that money burning is never optimal when
preferences respect the single crossing property (since the condition for an intenor optimum
could never
i(R~) such
be satisfied). However, if (as assumed in this paper), given RH, there is some
that the marginal costs of x are inversely related to quality for x < ~(R~), but
positively related to quality for x > i(R~), then one can in principle have an interior optimum
involving money burning. By equation (9), this assumption has the additional implication that
the optimal signal involves a level of x in excess of *(R~).
It is of interest to note that, while the equilibrium achieves full separation along the
quality dimension, it also fully reveals ~~. In particular, each type choosing to bum money








VH(X*,RH,QH) - lkvH(x*,RH, QL)
(where we have used thesecond order condition tosign the denominator). Note in particular
that high quality agents will rely more heavily on x, and less heavily on ~, when their individual
costs of z~are higher.
D. The Effects of Taxation
We now consider the effects of taxing a nondiscriminating activity. Let k denote the
index of the activity that is subject to taxation, We will suppose throughout the following
analysis that, fixing x, z, and R, the tax reduces the utility of every agent, regardless of type,
by the amount ~ for each unit of z~. This is easily incorporated into the preceding analysis by
defining L~ q L: + r , B~ = BkO+ ~, and, for each sender, yk = y; + ~ . That is, one can
think of ~~, which is distributed on [~,B~, as tax-inclusive costs, and y:, which is distributed
on [L~, B~], as tax-exclllsive costs.
With this reinterpretation of our original model, one can immediately derive the following
surprising result:
~eorem 2
Let Sk(r) denot(’ th(’Subset of high quulity types in r that choose to signal with the k-th
nondiscril?linating activip. If T > T’, then Sk(T’) C Sk(r).
13Proof. By definition, 1~ = (y; + r)/(L~ + r). Consequently,
with strict inequality when y; z L:. The desired result then follows from theorem 1. n
Thmrem 2 indicates that the use of any particular nondiscriminating signal becomes more
widespread when that signal is subject to a higher rate of taxation. Intuitively, nondiscriminating
signals are “noisy” because they are contaminated by activity preferences. When the
government subjects an activity to a publicly observable tax, this “purifies” the signal by
reducing the size of the noise as a fraction of the total cost.
We depict the effect of taxation on activity choice graphically in figures I and II. For
the purposes of these figures, we assume that the sender chooses between two nondiscriminating
activities, the first of which may be subject to taxation. In a world with no taxes (figure I), the
sender chooses to signal through z, whenever
L2
(13) y22y; — .
L:
In contrast, in a world with taxes (figure II), the sender chooses to signal through z, whenever
(14) y2 >
Notice that the line defining both constraints passes through the point (L~, L2), but constraint
14(14) has a smaller slope. This means, as shown in figure II, that the tax on activity 1 enlarges
the region of the preference space in which activity 1 is chosen.
In addition to studying the effects of taxation on the choice of a nondiscriminating
activity, it is also of interest to investigate the impact of taxation on the levels of the signaling








(where, in signing this term, we have made use of the second order condition). Thus, for an
agent who signals with the k-th nondiscriminating activity, an increase in the rate of taxation on
activity k reduces the extent to which the agent signals through the discriminating activity, x.
In effwt, the “purification” of the signal resulting from the imposition of the publicly observed
tax on z~induces ~heagent to substitute away from x. It is then immediate from equation (10)
that, for such an individual, the total amount of utility dissipated through z~rises with the tax
rate on z~. The effect of the tax rate on the equilibrium level of ~ is, however, ambiguous.
This reflects the offsetting effects of two factors: the higher tax rate induces the sender using
z~to substitute from x to ~; however, a higher rate of taxation also implies that the sender can
create the same penalty for prospective imitators through a smaller level of q.
If taxation renders a potential money-burning signal more attractive by “purifying” its
content, then one might well wonder whether an increase in the tax rate yields a Pareto
improvement.7 The following result establishes that this conjecture is, in fact, comect.
1517zeorem 3
An increme in the tu rate T is Pareto improving in the following seine: it strictly
increases payo~s for high qualiy senders who we or switch to the taed activity; it
leaves the payofls of all other senders unaffected; under Assumption R, it leaves the
payofs of receivers unaffected; and it strictly increaes revenue.
Remark. It follows immediately from this theorem that one could achieve a




divided equally among all agents.
strict
lump
High quality senders who are induced to switch to the taxed activity as a result
in r must be better off -- otherwise, they would not switch. For those who bum
money through activity k both before and after the tax increase, note that
(16,)
~U(X*, Z*,R~, Q~, Y) = Vx(X*,R~,Q~) ~
dx”
= [VX(x*,R~,Q~) - ~~VX(X*,R~,Q~)l ~
where we have made use of equations (9),
senders who do not use or switch to activity
>0,
(10), and the fact that d~/dr <0. High quality
k are clearly unaffected by the tax increase, as are
low quality types and (under Assumption R) receivers.
There is clearly an increase in revenue raised from senders who switch to the taxed
activity as a result of the tax increase. For senders who already used the tied activity,






T ~z; = [V(X*,R~,Q~) - V(O,R~,Q~)l .
L;+r
t/(L~ + t) is increasing in ~. Expression (15) indicates that x“ is decreasing in ~.
term in square brackets is also increasing in 7. Since both terms are strictly positive,
expression increases in r. n
Thmrem 3 contrasts with the usual result for signaling models with money burning,
where the effects of taxation are usually completely neutral (SW e.g. Bemheim [1991] or
Bagwell and Bernheim [1996])
absence of private information
The usual neutrality result follows from the fact that, in the
about rates of dissipation, taxes substitute perfectly for other
costs. In the current context, taxes enhance welfare by purifying an imperfwt signal. g
The possibility of Pareto improving taxes in this model raises an important question: why
is the private sector unable to organize institutions that would remedy the original market failure
in an equivalent fashion? Our analysis is driven by the assumption that the private sector cannot
generate a money burning activity for which the true rate of dissipation is public knowledge.
One possible justification for this assumption is that arrangements betwen private parties are
never completely observable.
Imagine, for example, that, in the absence of taxation, an entrepreneur senses a profit
opportunity, and sets him/herself up as a “private tax collector” (henceforth PTC). The PTC
encourages senders to purchase its “services,” which consist of exactly nothing, for a positive
price. The PTC also widely publicizes a list of its customers, along with “volume” and price.
Finally, the PTC hires an accounting firm to audit its transactions, and to certify the veracity
17of the published list. In this way, the PTC offers a private mechanism for dissipating verifiable
quantities of resources.
Unfortunate y for private markets, however, the PTC’S services may not be viewed as
clean signals. Imagine the consequences of competition among PTCS. A PTC would not be
able to lure customers by lowering published prices, since the published price of its “service”
is irrelevant (only expenditures matter). However, a PTC would be able to attract customers
by maintaining published prices and granting smret price concessions. Obviously, each PTC
would have an incentive to police its published prices as visibly as possible to establish
credibility. 9 However, secret price concessions between the PTC and its customers would be
very difficult to police privately. For example, it would be hard for outsiders to detect
artificially inflated prices on other transactions between a customer and a PTC affiliate. The
mere possibility that some PTCS might pay secret kickbacks implies that the true rate of resource
dissipation for a PTC customer would be, at least to some degrw, private information. Thus,
the use of a PTC’S services might be taken as signaling the existence of side deals, rather than
quality. As long as the government can credibly commit not to kick back taxes secretly on a
quid-pro-quo basis, the payment of taxes may provide a more believable means of dissipating
a fixed quantity of resources.
Throughout this section, we have assumed that only one of the nondiscriminating
activities is subject to taxation. One can easily introduce taxes on the other activities as well.
All of the preceding analysis would still follow, with the exception of the statement concerning
revenues in Theorem 3. In principle, an increase in the tax rate on a particular activity could
reduce revenues by inducing senders to shift from more highly taxed money burning signals.
18Even so, a sufficiently large increase in the rate of taxation on every nondiscriminating signal
would still yield a Pareto improvement.
111. An Application to Corporate Dividend Policy
In this swtion, we explore an application of the general thary developed in section II
to corporate dividend policy. Part A provides relevant background on the thary of corporate
dividends. Part B elaborates on the application of our thary to corporate payout policy. Part
C examines empirical evidence to determine whether the distinctive predictions of the theory are
consistent with actual experience.
A. The Theorv of CorDorate Dividends
Traditionally, the widespread use of dividends as a method of distributing cash to
shareholders has been regarded as puzzling. While it is not difficult to account for the
distribution of some earnings, dividends are treated less favorably than repurchases (even under
current law) and therefore appear to be strictly dominated as a mechanism for transferring
resources to shareholders. The common practice of paying dividends and issuing new equity
simultaneously is especially difficult to understand, since a company could reduce dividends and
new equity issues by equal amounts, thereby reducing tax liabilities without altering net
distributions.
Applications of signaling theory in the area of corporate payout policy have become
increasingly common (see Bhattacharya [1979,1980], Hakansson [1982], Miller and Rock
[1985], Kumar [1988], Kumar and Spatt [1987], and John and Nachman [1987]). Yet few
authors have ventured explanations for the practice of signaling with dividends rather than
19repurchases. Notable exceptions include John and Williams [1985] and Bemheim [1991].10
In effwt, both papers argue that it may be efficient to use nondiscriminating signals, such as
dividends, in situations where it is optimal to bum money. 11
John and Williams do not consider the possibility that firms might signal profitability by
burning money in other forms, such as through charitable contributions, the construction of
conspicuous y expensive facilities, or advertising. Bemheim [1991] mentions this possibility,
and attempts to resolve the issue by introducing -- as an extension to his basic model --
additional dimensions of private information, much as we have done in section II. In the context
of corporate dividend policy, he obtains the counterpart of our Theorem 1. Unfortunately, his
analysis of equilibrium activity levels and tax policy is confined to his basic model, in which the
choice among nondiscriminating signals is implicitly indeterminant. As we have seen in section
II, implications for tax policy and characterizations of equilibrium activity levels change when
one moves from the basic money burning model (in which rates of resource dissipation are
public knowledge) to a model in which the choice of a nondiscriminating signal is fully
determined.
B. Dividends as ODtimal Nondiscriminatory Signals
To understand the application of the current analysis in this context, it is necessary to
formulate an explicit model of corporate payout policy. Consider a signaling environment in
which the sender is a firm, and the receiver is a representative potential investor. The firm’s
message consists of K+ 1distinct activities that reduce retained earnings, including repurchases,
dividends, charitable contributions, and so forth. We will define x as the total amount of
resources devoted to all of these activities (henceforth “total payouts”), and we will use the
20vwtor z will to describe the allocation of x across activities. In particular, z will be a K-
dimensional vector, where the k-th element of z describes the level of resources devoted to the
k-th activity, and where the level of the K+ l-th activity is determined as a residual. Thus, the
firm sends the “message” m = (x,z). We will arbitrarily take repurchases to be the K+ l-th
activity, so that the message m = (x,(O,O,...)) implies that the firm spends the amount x
repurchasing shares, and does not engage in any other earnings-reducing activity. We will also
take dividends to be the first element of z, so that the message m = (x,(x, O,O,...)) indicates that
the firm pays a dividend of x, and does not engage in any other earnings-reducing activity.
Next, let Q denote the true (or full-information) value of the firm when m = (0,0). Even
when investors correctly infer Q, if m # (0,0) they will value the firm at less than Q, since the
message m is costly (see below), In particular, we assume that the actual value of the firm is
given by
K
(18) W(X, Z,Q) “ Q - c(x, Q) - ~ d~z~ .
k=l
In this formulation, total payouts (x) reduce the full information value of the firm by c(x,Q)
(where CX(X,Q)> O), reflecting considerations such as the increased likelihood of costly
bankruptcy. Each of the first K payout activities also wastes some of the distributed resources,
relative to repurchases. Thus, if z~represents dividends, then ~~might measure the effective tax
rate on dividends, relative to the effective tax rate on repurchases, Likewise, if z~represents
charitable contributions, and if these contributions are not valued by shareholders, then & = 1.
Upon observing m, investors will make inferences about the likelihood that the firm is
high quality. Let P denote the subjative probability assessment of the representative investor
21that Q = QH. We assume that investors are risk-neutral, and that the value of the stock, P, is
determined by competitive bidding among the investors, so that
(19) P(p,m) = PW(X, Z,Q~) + (1 - P) W(X, Z,Q~) .
We will assume that the manager cares about the current price of the firm, P, the true
value of the firm, W, and possibly about the activities ~. In particular, the payoff to the
manager is given by
(20)
K
ap(p,m) + W(X, Z,Q) + ~ kk-zk
k-l
At first glance, it may not be obvious that this model fits into our framework. This is
because the preceding discussion does not explicitly identify the receiver’s response. Moraver,
if we think of the receiver’s response as the “bid” P(P,m), then, contrary to the assumptions in
section II, this response depends directly upon the message m. However, since the process that
translates inferences into bids is purely mechanical, one can think of the rweiver’s response as
the formation of the belief P; that is, R(P) = P. In that case, the manager’s (sender’s) utility
takes the form of equation (1), where
(21) V(X,R,Q) q Q - c(x,Q) + aR[Q~ -c(x,Q~)l +
and
(22) yk=(1+a)6k-Pk .
Note that V is decreasing in x and strictly increasing in R, as
there is some ~ such that cX(x,Q~)> cX(x,Q~)iff O < x <
a(l -R)[Q~ - C(X,Q~)l
required. Moreover, to the extent
i, we will also have VX(x,R,Q~
22< VX(x,R,Q~iff O < x
Thus, the analysis
< i, as assumed in section II.12
of section II is directly applicable to our model of corporate payout
policy. It follows that some fraction of firms will strictly prefer to use dividends as a
nondiscriminating signal (Theorem 1). As Bemheim [1991] argues, this fraction will be large
if managers have relatively little private information concerning yl (the marginal cost of shifting
the form of distribution from repurchases to dividends).
Although managers probably acquire relatively little private information concerning ~1
compared with other ~~,it is doubtful that all of their information about ~1is public. In general,
managers probably learn about yl through private contacts with shareholders. Large institutional
shareholders may express their payout preferences directly to management, and these preferences
may be driven in part by non-tax factors that are difficult for other investors to observe. A
university s~king to increase the liquidity of its endowment might, for example, attempt to
influence the dividend policy of firms in which its holdings are substantial.
Provided that managers do possess private information concerning
implies that the fraction of firms with positive dividends should rise with the
yl, our analysis
dividend tax rate
(Theorem 2). Increases in the dividend tax rate would also be Pareto improving. To establish
this result, one invokes the portions of Theorem 3 that do not depend upon Assumption R. One
then adds the observation that receivers are also unaffected by the dividend tax, since
competitive bidding always drives investor surplus to zero. 13
C. EmDirical Analvsis
Although our conclusions concerning the welfare effects of dividend taxation are
provocative, they are not directly testable. The implications of Theorem 2 are, however, equally
23striking, and distinguish our model from other thmries of corporate payout policy.
Consequently, it should be possible to test our theory by examining the effwt of dividend
taxation on the use of cash dividends.
Previous authors have studied therelation between dividend taxation and the aggregate
level of dividends in Britain (e.g. Feldstein [1970], Poterba and Summers [1985]) and the United
States (e.g. Poterba [1987]). Generally, an increase in the relative taxation of dividends has
bwn found to reduce the level of dividends in the aggregate. It is important to realize, however,
that the aggregate change in dividends refl~t a combination of two factors: a change in the level
of dividends for dividend-paying firms, and a change in the set of firms that choose to pay
dividends. In most models of corporate payout policy, these two effects are reinforcing. In our
model, they work in opposite directions. While our model is certainly consistent with the
observed negative relation between dividend tax rates and aggregate dividends, it has the striking
implication that an increase in dividend taxation should nevertheless increase the fraction of
firms paying dividends. In the remainder of this section, we examine empirical evidence to
determine whether this distinctive prediction is consistent with actual experience.
Our empirical analysis is based on annual U.S. data for the period 1963-1988, inclusive.
The dependent variable in our analysis, FIRMTOT,, measures the fraction (normalized to lie
between Oand 1) of all companies incorporated within the U.S. with ordinary common shares
listed on either the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the American Stock Exchange
(AMEX) that paid at least one cash dividend to shareholders during the year t. The recluired
information is extracted from data tapes compiled by the Center for Research in Securities Prices
(CRSP). CRSP differentiates cash dividends by frquency and tax status. For the bulk of our
24analysis, we use the broadest possible definition of cash dividends. However, we also explore
the robustness of our results to alternative definitions, such as recurring (monthly, quarterly,
semi-annual, or annual) “normal” payments to shareholders that are fully taxable as ordin~
income to individuals.









where mj[is the marginal dividend tax rate at time t for investors in class j, zjtis the accrual-
equivalent capital gains tax rate at time t for investors in class j, wjt are equity ownership
weights, and s is the number of distinct shareholder classes. 14 We obtained historical data on
0, from
pension
Poterba [1987]. 15 Poterba’s measures of
funds, insurance companies, and banks are
of funds data. The distribution of dividend income
equity ownership weights for households,
taken from the Federal Reserve Board flow
across income classes within the household
swtor is based on Internal Revenue Service data. Poterba treats each income class as a separate
shareholder category, and computes the marginal tax rate on dividend income for investors in
each class. He constructs the capital gains tax rate by assuming that the effective accrual rate
is approximately 0.25 times the statutory rate.
Additional explanatory variables are included to control for other economic conditions.
As in essentially all previous studies of aggregate dividend levels, we include a measure of
corporate profits, PROFt. This variable expresses corporate profits as a percent of gross
domestic product (the unit of measurement being percentage points). Our measure of corporate
25profits is obtained from the Citibase data files, and incorporates corrections for inflationary
distortions of inventory valuation and capital consumption that result from historical cost-based
accounting. In some specifications, we also control for the lagged value of this variable
(LPROF).
It is noteworthy that voluntary dividend guidelines were adopted during the wage and
price control period of the early 1970s. Poterba [1987] has found that these guidelines
significantly depressed aggregated dividend levels. It is therefore important to allow, in some
of our specifications, for the possibility y that the guidelines also reduced the fraction of firms
paying dividends. Thus, following Poterba [1987], we introduce an indicator variable, DG,
which equals unity for the years 1972-74. ‘b
Finally, we introduce several macroeconomic variables to control for possible business ‘
cycle effects on corporate dividend policy. These variables include capacity utilization expressed
as a percentage of total capacity (CAPUTIQ, the civilian unemployment rate (UNEMPJ, and
the rate of growth in real gross domestic product computed from the fourth quarter of the
preceding year to the fourth quarter of the current year (GDPGRO~. The unit of measurement
for each of these variables is percentage points. In certain specifications, we also examine the
sensitivity of our results to the inclusion of a trend variable (YEARJ.
Before turning to our findings, it is important to discuss our a priori expectations
concerning the pattern of coefficients on variables other than 0,. Since previous investigators
have found a strong positive relation between dividends and corporate profits, one might expect
a similar relation to exist between FIRMTOT, and PROF~. However, if companies pay dividends




This is because the variable PROF, is public information, whereas the
paying dividends should be determined by the distribution of private
To understand this point, imagine a
only two types of firms (“low quality” and
to shareholders (dividends). Let H and ~
simple dividend signaling model in which there are
“high quality”) and one method of distributing cash
+ A (with A > O)denote, resp~tively, the levels
of profits earned by low and high quality firms. Suppose that dividends are costly, and that the
marginal cost of paying a dividend declines monotonically in retained earnings (so that the single
crossing property is satisfied). Finally, let Adenote the fraction of firms that are high quality.
For this model, H + AAis the analog of PROF. If PROF rises as the result of an increase in
either ~, A, or A, the average level of dividends increases (as observed in practice). la In
contrast, FIRMTOT equals A; changes in PROF arising from changes in
on the fraction of firms paying dividends. Indmd, appropriately chosen
Areduce the frequency of dividend usage while raising average profits.
H or A have no effect
changes in H, A, and
When the single crossing property fails to hold and firms have many alternative methods
of burning money (as in the more elaborate signaling model described in section 111. B), the link
betw=n average profitability and the fraction of firms paying dividends becomes even more
obscure. It difficult to see why the average level of profits across all firms would have an effect
on the relative desirability of different nondiscriminatory methods of burning money (e.g.
dividends vs. charity). Thus, our model (like other more standard signaling models) has no
particular implication concerning the effect of PROF, on FIRMTOT,.
Similar remarks apply with respect to our macrtionomic variables (CAPUTI~,
27UNEMPI, and GDPGROJ. Generally, there is no reason to believe that more vigorous
macroeconomic activity (as indicated by higher capacity utilization, lower unemployment, or
higher GDP growth) would change the distribution of private information in a way that would
systematically raise or lower the fraction of firms paying dividends. Ind~, even the thmretical
link between macroeconomic activity and the level of dividends (for dividend-paying firms) is
obscure: the marginal cost of paying dividends might rise during recessions
themselves closer to insolvency, or it might rise during booms b~ause
dividend requires firms to forego more profitable investment opportunities.
because firms find
the payment of a
An inspection of the data reveals quite a strong positive correlation betw=n the fraction
of firms paying dividends, and the effective tax rate on dividends. The key series are depicted
in figure III. During the first few years of our sample, the fraction of all listed firms paying
dividends (FIRMTOT) appears to move in the same direction as 0. However, this pattern
reverses in the late 60s, Between 1968 and 1979, 0 falls and then rises, while FIRMTOT rises
and then falls. Subsequent to 1979, 0 rises and FIRMTOT falls monotonically. Overall, the
correlation coefficientt between FIRMTOT and 0 is -0.5648. When only NYSE stocks are
included, the correlation coefficient becomes -0.8547. The sign of this correlation is robust
across subperiods. Since the 1980s witnessed several rounds of tax reform, a wave of mergers,
and rapid growth of repurchase activity, one natural point to divide the sample is 1981/82. For
the pre-1982 sample, the correlation coefficients are -0.2476 for all listed companies and -0.4534
for companies listed only on the NYSE; for the post-1981 sample, these correlation coefficients
are -0.8721 and -0.8674, respective]y.
When interpreting these results, it is important to keep in mind that Odeclines when the
28dividend tax rate rises. Thus, the empirical patterns indicate that an increase in dividend
taxation tends to be associated with an increase in the fraction of firms paying dividends. To
the extent this finding proves robust when empirically tested while controlling for other relevant
macrtionomic factors, it would be consistent with the implications of Theorem 2, and difficult
to reconcile with other views of corporate dividend policy.
The results in table I measure the relation between dividend taxation and the fraction of
companies paying dividends in the NYSE/AMEX sample, controlling for other explanatory
variables. 19 The dependent variable (FIRMTOT) has been multiplied by 100 to scale the
coefficients more conveniently. Each regression specification is initially estimated using
ordinary least squares. However, the Durbin-Watson statistics generally indicate (with varying
degrees of significance) positive autocorrelation of the OLS residuals in our sample. Therefore,
each regression was re-estimated using the Cochrane-Orcutt iterative procedure to correct for
AR(1) residuals. To verify that the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure is appropriate, the GLS residuals
associated with the Cochrane-Orcutt estimates are then tested for first- and second- order
autocorrelation using the Breusch-Godfrey LM test.
Equations (1) and (2) control for corporate profits, macrowonomic conditions, and the
1972-1974 dividend guidelines. The coefficients of Oare negative and significant at levels of
confidence in excess of 99%, indicating that a higher dividend tax rate increases the fraction of
companies paying dividends, precisely as predicted by our model. One can obtain some feel for
the magnitude of this key coefficient through an example. Imagine that all investors face an
effective marginal tax rate on capital gains of 0.20. Then an increase in the effective marginal
tax rate on dividends (assumed for simplicity to be constant across investors) from 0.30 to 0.40
29reduces 0 from 0.875 to 0.750. Our estimates imply that a change of this magnitude would
ordinarily be associated with a rise of 9.55 percentage points in the number of firms paying
dividends.
The Breusch-Godfrey LM test was used as a diagnostic to determine whether the
residuals continued to follow an AR(1) or AR(2) process after application of the Cochrane-Orcutt
procedure. These statistics, which are distributed X2(1)for the AR(1) tests and X2(2)for the
AR(2) tests (under the null hypothesis of no remaining autocorrelation) are presented, together
with the associated p-values. The tests show no evidence of first or second-order autocorrelation
surviving the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure. This finding validates statistical inferences based on
the estimated coefficients and standard errors.
The coefficients of the other independent variables merit some comment. The fraction
of firms paying dividends is negatively related to aggregate corporate profits, but the estimated
coefficient is statistically insignificant. While this may at first seem peculiar, it is (for reasons
discussed earlier in this section) entirely consistent with the general hypothesis that firms pay
dividends to signal profitability. The pattern of coefficients for our macroeconomic variables
reveals no clear relation betwwn FIRMTOT, and the phase of the business cycle; FIRMTOT,
rises with capacity utilization, but also rises with unemployment and falls with GDP growth.
For the reasons discussed earlier, the absence of a clear pattern should not be regarded as
surprising. Finally, we find that the dividend guidelines significantly depressed the fraction of
companies that pay dividends, in keeping with Poterba’s [1987] finding on the level of aggregate
dividends.
In the remainder of table I, we explore the sensitivity of our results to alternative
30s~ifications of the dynamic process for dividend adjustment. Equations (3) and (4) follow
much of empirical literature on factors determining the aggregate level of dividends by
supplementing our basic specification with a measure of lagged profits. In principle, this allows
for the possibility that dividends adjust gradually to changes in corporate profits. The estimated
coefficients of LPROF are positive but insignificant, and the other coefficients (most notably that
of 0) are little changed. The LM tests again show no evidence of a first-order autoregressive
error process. While the test for a second-order autoregressive process is somewhat more
suggestive of difficulties, the test statistic remains insignificant even at the 10% level. ~uations
(5) and (6) incorporate the YEAR variable to account for the possible existence of a time trend.
The trend variable is insignificant, the estimated coefficients for 0,increase slightly,20and there
is again no evidence of a problematic error structure.
Table II contains additional results that further establish the robustness of our central
findings. For equations (1) and (2), we reconstruct our dependent variable based on a more
narrow definition of dividends -- regularly recurring (monthly, quarterly, semi-annual, or annual)
“normal” payments to shareholders that are fully taxable as ordinary income to individuals. The
coefficients of 0,are estimated somewhat less precisely, but their magnitudes are little changed.
When the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure is used (equation (2)), the coefficient of PROFITS, changes
sign, but is still statistical y insignificant.
For equations (3) and (4), we return to our original definition of dividends, but restrict
attention to firms listed on the NYSE. There is only a negligible effect on the estimated
coefficients (and associated standard errors) of 0,. Once again, the coefficient on PROFITS,
changes sign, but remains statistically insignificant.
31Finally, for equations (5) and (6), we restrict attention to the set of firms that were traded
continuously on either the NYSE or AMEX throughout the sample period. We undertake this
exercise to explore the possibility that our results might be attributable to spurious changes in
the composition of firms listed on these exchanges. This restriction significantly reduces the
number of firms used to calculate FIRMTOT(; while each data point in the original series was
calculated using a sample of at least 2,000 firms, our fixed-firm series is based on a sample of
467 firms. The substantial reduction in sample size raises the possibility that the restricted
sample may not be representative. Indd, since the firms in this subsample tend to be older
and more stable, they are significantly more likely to pay dividends in any given year.
Nevertheless, results based on this sample provide further insight into the robustness of our key
findings. Although the coefficients of d, are much smaller than in our basic specification,
precision is also remarkably improved, and the estimated effects remain statistical y significant
at high levels of confidence. The smaller quantitative effect of tax policy could be attributable
to the fact that older, more stable firms are less inclined to change their established dividend
policies; nevertheless, the central result comes through. The other coefficients closely resemble
those obtained in our basic specification, and there is again no evidence that the error structure
is problematic.
We have performed a variety of other robustness exercises that, for the sake of brevity,
are not reported in either table. For example, we have estimated separate equations using
various combinations of the independent variables. Generally, our central findings emerge
intact. For example, the estimated coefficient of fl~is little affected by the omission of either
the macroeconomic controls or the dividend guideline dummy variable, and its t-statistic
32continues to indicate a high level of statistical significance. However, in both cases there is
evidence of residual first and second-order autocorrelation even after the application of the
Cochrane-Orcutt procedure. Given the time series properties of the omitted variables, this is
not surprising. Despite the fact that statistical inference is problematic for the unreported
specifications, the robustness of the key coefficient provides us with considerable comfort.
IV. Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a theory of signaling via “money burning” that resolves
each sender’s indifference among alternative nondiscriminating signals. We establish three
central results: (1) all potential money burning activities are used by some senders in
equilibrium, (2) the taxation of a nondiscriminating signal is Pareto improving, and (3) an
increase in the tax rate causes the use of the taxed activity to become more widespread. We
have also applied this theory to the use of cash dividends as a signal of financial strength, The
central testable ireplication of the model -- that an increase in the dividend tax rate should
increase the number of firms that signal profitability by paying dividends -- has proven to be
consistent with historical experience. This finding raises the possibility that the dividend tax
may be Pareto improving.
Stanford University and Fordham University
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35Endnotes
1. Milgrom and Roberts note this themselves [pp. 799-800], as do Bagwell and Bemheim
[p. 28].
2. Separation along the dimensions of z is inconsequential, since the receiver does not
care about y.
3. Naturally, the model can also give rise to a variety of pooling equilibria. In many
standard settings, no pooling equilibria survive application of the “equilibrium dominance”
criterion proposed by Cho and Kreps [1987], which we use later to refine the set of
separating equilibria. However, in this context, there may exist certain kinds of pooling
equilibria that satisfy this and other refinements. We focus on separating equilibria because
we have bmn unable to identify a class of pooling equilibria that is robust against
refinements and reasonably simple in structure, for which existence is generally guaranteed.
Although we leave the properties of pooling equilibria as open issues for further research, we
conjecture that the key elements of our analysis will survive. In particular, an increase in the
rate of taxation applied to a money burning activity should induce more agents to engage in
the activity because it “purifies” the associated message (decreases the relative importance of
private information).
4. In any separating equilibrium, low quality types are correctly identified as such.
Consequently, they experience an equilibrium response of R~. In a perfect Bayesian
quilibrium, the receiver never chooses R < R~ for any message m. If low quality types
were assigned an equiIibrium message involving positive levels of x or z, they could increase
36their payoff by choosing m = O. Consequently, they must choose m = O.
5. For a fully separating equilibrium to exist, it must be the case that the maximized value
of the objective function exceeds V(O,R~,Q~. We will assume this throughout.
6. The second order condition requires that Vu(x,R~, Q~) - k~Vn(x,R~,Q~) <0.
This condition will be useful in the subsequent analysis,
7. In considering whether an increase in the tax rate yields a Pareto improvement, we
abstract from the possibility that parties outside the model might benefit from the untaxed
non-discriminating activities. In certain contexts, reductions in non-taxed discriminating
activities (such as charity) might be harmful to third parties.
8. Theorem 3 bears some relation to the analysis of Rotemberg [1988], who demonstrated
that a tax on a signal may be Pareto improving if the single crossing property fails to hold,
and if senders are structurally prevented from burning money, We have demonstrated that
the taxation of a signal may also be Pareto improving even when senders have access to
money burning technologies, as long as there is some private information (unrelated to the
characteristics being signaled) about true rates of resource dissipation.
9. Indeed, the manufacturers of conspicuous consumption goods often go to great lengths
to assure that discounters do not degrade the signaling value of their products; see Bagwell
and Bemheim [1994].
10. The analysis of John and Williams has been extended by Ambansh, John, and
Williams [1987] and Williams [1988].
3711. Despite this commonality, the models considered in these two papers differ in a
number of other important respects, The relationships between them are discussed in
Bemheim [1991].
12. As noted in Bernheim [1991], this property follows naturally from the presence of
bankruptcy constraints.
13. It is natural to embellish the model by imagining a s~ial class of investors who are
the initial owners of the firms. In that case, initial owners of high quality, dividend paying
firms will benefit
unaffected.
from an increase in dividend taxation, while other initial owners will be
14. By using data on 0, that are constructed in this way, we implicitly assume that
dividends are received in proportion to equity ownership. It is well known that floor traders,
who are taxed equally on ordinary income and capital gains and losses, engage in tax
arbitrage around ex days, and indeed some evidence indicates that these individuals receive a
disproportionate share of dividends. Although it is therefore likely that 0, overstates effective
dividend taxation, movements in 0, should nevertheless capture relative movements in the
true effective dividend tax rate, particularly around major shifts in tax policy.
15, For 1987 and 1988 data on 0, were obtained directly from James Poterba (private
communication).
16. According to Poterba [1987], voluntary dividend controls were in effect between
November 14, 1971, and April 30, 1974. The guidelines suggested that dividends should be
limited to 4 percent above the highest payout level in the thrm years before the controls.
3817. The expectation might be more reasonable under Jensen and Meclding’s [1976] “free
cash flow” hypothesis.
18. If H rises, the marginal cost of dividends falls, and high quality firms must pay
higher dividends to deter imitation. If A rises, imitation results in a larger share price
increase, and high quality firms must therefore pay higher dividends to differentiate
themselves. If A rises, high quality firms pay the same level of dividends, but there are
more high quality firms.
19. In these tables, we have adopted relatively simple functional specifications. As a
practical matter, the relative brevity of our sample period dictates parsimony.
20. While the standard errors of these coefficients also rise, they remain statistically
significant at high levels of confidence.
39Table I
Determinants of Dividend Usage, NYSE/Amex Sample
Variable OLS c-o OLS c-o OLS c-o






































































































































Determinants of Dividend Usage, Examination of Robustness
Variable OLS c-o OLS c-o OLS c-o
Narrow Narrow NYSE-only NYSE-only Fixed Fixed

















































































































































Time Series of Key Variables
60 65 70 75
Year
80 85 90
Theta
Firmtot
Firmtot, NYSE